TSA failed to identify 73 employees potentially associated with terrorism

TSA failed to identify 73 employees potentially associated with terrorism

Published 9 June 2015

 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) yesterday released a report on TSA’s controls over the vetting of aviation workers who apply for credentials allowing unescorted access to secured airport areas. The TSA repeatedly screens about two million airport workers, but OIG says that the agency failed to identify seventy-three workers potentially associated with terrorism. One reason for this slip: the DHS watch-list, against which the TSA checks airline and airport applicants and workers, is not as comprehensive as the government’s terrorist database. TSA says it will begin to check applicants and employees against the broader list by the end of the year.

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) yesterday released a report on TSA’s controls over the vetting of aviation workers who apply for credentials allowing unescorted access to secured airport areas. DHS OIG reviewed TSA’s process for vetting workers for terrorist links, criminal history, and lawful status. OIG says that the review also sought to determine the accuracy and reliability of data the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses for vetting.
The TSA repeatedly screens about two million airport workers, but OIG says that the agency failed to identify seventy-three workers potentially associated with terrorism. “TSA acknowledged that these [seventy-three] individuals were cleared for access to secure airport areas despite representing a potential transportation security threat,” the OIG’s 34-page report said.
USA Today reports that the DHS watch-list, against which the TSA checks airline and airport applicants and workers, is not as comprehensive as the government’s terrorist database. The DHS terrorist screening database does not include all information from the National Counterterrorism Center’s more comprehensive Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). In its formal response to OIG, TSA noted that TIDE list “includes raw data that may not have been corroborated or found to be fulsome enough for inclusion” on the DHS watch list.
TSA said that by the end of the year it would be checking applicants and employees against the broader government watch-list base. In May 2014, former TSA administrator John Pistole signed a memo asking to screen credentialed workers against the broader TIDE list.
TSA noted that it has already taken steps better to vet employees, following the December 2014 discovery of a gun-smuggling ring operated by employees at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson Airport.
“Immediately following the incident in December 2014, TSA increased random and unpredictable screening of aviation workers at various airport access points to mitigate security vulnerabilities,” TSA said in the statement. “TSA recognizes the value of complete and accurate information when conducting biographic and biometric vetting, and will continue to identify areas for enhancement.”
In the review, the DHS OIG concluded:

• TSA has multiple, layered controls for vetting workers for terrorism, and its process is generally effective. However, TSA could not identify all individuals on the Consolidated Terrorist Watch-list because current interagency watch-listing policy does not authorize TSA to receive all terrorism-related categories of information. DHS OIG identified seventy-three individuals with possible terrorism-related information which was not reported to TSA. TSA acknowledged that these individuals were cleared for access to secure airport areas despite representing a potential security threat.
• TSA lacks effective controls for vetting applicant’s criminal history and work authorization. TSA relies on individual airports for criminal history and work authorization checks. Presently, TSA does not have an adequate monitoring process in place to ensure that airport operators properly adjudicated credential applicants’ criminal histories.
• Moreover, law and FBI policy generally prohibit TSA and the airports to conduct recurrent criminal history vetting and rely on individuals to self- report disqualifying crimes. TSA is planning a pilot program for late 2015 whereby the FBI will begin providing automated updated from the FBI for new criminal history matches associated with individuals who have undergone prior criminal history records checks.
• With respect to work authorization vetting, TSA data indicates that airports may not be consistently verifying that credential applicants possess the immigration status necessary to work in the United States.
• Finally, DHS OIG identified thousands of aviation worker records which appeared to have incomplete or inaccurate biographic information, including incomplete names, passport numbers, alien registration numbers, Social Security Numbers, and aliases. TSA has taken steps to address some of these weaknesses, and enhancements should become effective within two years.

OIG notes that TSA agreed with the recommendations in the DHS OIG’s report. Inspector General John Roth — who will be testifying before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs about these and other TSA issues today (Tuesday, 9 June) — noted that “it is vital to airport security that only fully vetted aviation workers receive credentials to access secure areas of our nation’s airports. We are pleased that TSA has agreed to our recommended improvements.”