Focusing on how, rather than why, individuals make the transition to terrorism

Focusing on how, rather than why, individuals make the transition to terrorism

Published 11 June 2015

 

Intelligence and counterterrorism officials have spent tremendous effort to understand why people become Islamist terrorists and commit acts of violence. Up till the 1980s, a significant number of terrorism scholars argued that terrorists are “driven” or “pushed” to commit violence because of an internal imbalance or a psychological abnormality rooted inside the individual. In recent years, scholars have suggested that the roots of terrorism are not in the individual, but in the social environment in which terrorists live and act. The debate goes, leading scholars to argue that the concerns of law enforcement officials should be less about why terrorists exist or commit violence, and more about the how, when, and where does the transition to terrorism take place.

Intelligence and counterterrorism officials have spent tremendous effort to understand why people become Islamist terrorists and commit acts of violence. Up till the 1980s, a significant number of terrorism scholars argued that terrorists are “driven” or “pushed” to commit violence because of an internal imbalance or a psychological abnormality rooted inside the individual.
In recent years, scholars have suggested that the roots of terrorism are not in the individual, but in the social environment in which terrorists live and act. This school of thought draws on a broader consensus in the social sciences about violence, particularly that it is “socially determined,” a product of deeper historical, economic, or cultural forces over and above the individuals. Social psychologist Albert Bandura summarized this thought on violence saying “it requires conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce atrocious deeds. Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can be led to do extraordinarily cruel things.”
Based on this reading of the sources of terrorism and violence, scholars assert that the roots of Islamist terrorism lie not in Islam but in the historical crimes and injustices of Western and U.S.-driven imperialism, specifically the post-9/11 era events such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. According to Defense One, Islamist terrorism, from this perspective, is an inevitable reaction driven by Muslim anger and vengeance; and Westernized Islamist terrorists are simply alienated from a West that excludes, insults, and disrespects Muslims.
Still, this thinking does not explain why only a minority of Muslims are violent extremists. According to sociologist Jack Katz, “whatever the validity of the hereditary, psychological, and social-ecological conditions of crime, many of those in the supposedly causal categories do not commit the crime at issue, … many who do commit the crime do not fit the causal categories, and … many who do fit the background categories and later commit the predicted crime go for long stretches without committing the crimes to which theory directs them.”
Referring to his research to understand why individuals become radicalized, terrorism scholar John Hogan wrote, “The most valuable interviews I’ve conducted (with former terrorists) have been ones in which the interviewees conceded, ‘To be honest, I don’t really know,’” he wrote. “Motivation is a very complicated issue. To explain why any of us does anything is a challenge.”
Perhaps the concerns of law enforcement officials should be less about why terrorists exist or commit violence, and more about the how, when, and where does the transition to terrorism take place. “How did this specific person come to join this specific organization? What networks helped facilitate the act of joining, and where and how were these networks accessed or sought out?” Defense One notes. Such questions focus on the circumstances of terrorism, and not the internal motives of terrorists. The answers to those questions are measurable, and could be used to prevent or stop terrorist recruitment. While law enforcement may be unable to disrupt a motive, with the right intelligence and skills, they may be able to disrupt a network of terrorist recruiters.