Bioweapons do not offer the same deterrence value nukes offer: Experts

Bioweapons do not offer the same deterrence value nukes offer: Experts

Published 31 March 2015

 

Biological and nuclear weapons are both considered weapons of mass destruction, but only nuclear weapons currently serve as a deterrence. Some security experts have proposed the idea of nations adopting non-contagious biological weapons as a new form of deterrence. Critics note that the consequences of starting a global biological arms race are troubling enough, but the concept of replacing nuclear weapons with biological weapons as a form of deterrence is flawed for three main reasons: uncertainty of effects, availability of defenses, and the need for secrecy and surprise.

Biological and nuclear weapons are both considered weapons of mass destruction, but only nuclear weapons currently serve as a deterrence. Some security experts have proposed the idea of nations adopting non-contagious biological weapons as a new form of deterrence. The new model “could work well if deterrence required threatening large human populations” without posing the risk of a global catastrophe like nuclear winter or a pandemic, writesSeth Baum, executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute.
The consequences of starting a global biological arms race are troubling enough, but the concept of replacing nuclear weapons with biological weapons as a form of deterrence is flawed for three main reasons: uncertainty of effects, availability of defenses, and the need for secrecy and surprise.
According to Gregory D. Koblentz, an associate professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs and deputy director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University, nuclear weapons instantaneously destroy their targets, causing predictable levels of harm. Biological weapons, however, take time to germinate and their effects can be unpredictable due to their sensitivity to environmental conditions and the importance of pathogens-host interactions. Furthermore, the inability to test the realistic effects of biological weapons, unless human experimentation is conducted, prevents nations from fully understanding how biological weapons will play out in a real life attack.
There are also no known practical defenses against the effects of a nuclear attack. A biological attack, on the other hand, can be countered with measures taken before, during, and after the attack. “Biological weapons use has been always uncertain, invisible, and delayed due to factors such as the incubation period,” according to a 2008 paper by Francisco Galamas. TheBulletin of the Atomic Scientists notes that because diseases have an incubation period of days to weeks, defenders may have time to detect an attack using sensors and biosurveillance systems. Masks and filters can prevent exposure to biological agents and vaccines can also be used to protect citizens and soldiers days or weeks before an attack. As a result, the effects of a biological attack are not absolute, and they can be curbed by a well-prepared defender. For this reason, nations relying on biological weaponsfor deterrence will have little confidence in their ability to launch catastrophic retaliatory strikes against an adversary.
During the cold war, the superpowers were able to flaunt their nuclear capabilities for deterrent purposes because doing so did not provide adversaries with improved means of defending against them. Biological weapons, however, have limited value as deterrents due to the need for states to hide their biological weapons programs for fear that the adversaries might develop defenses. Secrecy counters the goals of deterrence.
In his 2008 paper, Galamas suggests that new biotechnology techniques may enhance the deterrence capability of biological weapons, but Koblentz notes that while biological weapons have the ability to inflict great harm against an adversary, currently “they are unable to offer states an ‘assured’ capability for doing so.” Biological weapons do not measure up to the deterrence characteristics of nuclear weapons.
— Read more in Seth Baum, “Deterrence, without nuclear winter,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (9 March 2015); Seth Baum, “Winter-safe Deterrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge to Deterrence,” Contemporary Security Policy 36, no. 1 (2015): 123-48 (DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2015.1012346); and Francisco Galamas, “Biological Weapons, Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence: The Biotechnology Revolution,” Comparative Strategy 27, no. 4 (31 October 2008): 315-23 (DOI: 10.1080/01495930802358364)