Wednesday, October 1, 2014

TSA Needs To Strengthen Privacy Oversight Mechanisms, Audit Finds By: Amanda Vicinanzo, Contributing Editor

Although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has made great strides in implementing the Secure Flight program—a key tool for defending commercial flights from terrorist threats—further progress needs to be made to strengthen effective oversight of privacy-related issues, according to a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit.

TSA began implementing Secure Flight, an airline-passenger screening program, in 2009 in an effort to enhance the security of domestic and international commercial air travel. Passengers making an airline reservation are required to provide their full name (as it appears on the government-issued identification they plan to use when traveling), date of birth and gender. TSA then matches this information against government watch lists.

“Because the program relies on sensitive information, including personally identifiable information from the approximately 2 million people Secure Flight screens each day, privacy incidents and inappropriate disclosures could have significant negative impacts on the traveling public,” GAO’s audit report said.

While TSA has taken steps to implement several of the privacy oversight mechanisms it planned to establish at its launch in 2009, GAO found TSA could further strengthen these protections by providing job-specific privacy refresher training consistent with Office of Management and Budget privacy training requirements.

According to GAO, “DHS’s annual refresher training is not job-specific and does not reflect the unique privacy requirements of the Secure Flight program. For example, the DHS training provides a general overview of privacy requirements Department-wide, but does not provide information on the unique privacy risks of the Secure Flight program, such as the potential misuse or unauthorized disclosure of airline passenger data.”

In addition, GAO discovered TSA lacks a comprehensive system for documenting and tracking key privacy-related issues and decisions that arise through Secure Flight. GAO recommended implementing such a system, stating, “TSA would have greater assurance that its oversight of Secure Flight privacy protections is effective because TSA would know the extent to which privacy issues are identified and resolved.”

GAO also reviewed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), the central processing point within DHS to seek redress for travel-related screening difficulties experienced at transportation hubs or when crossing US borders.

GAO found DHS TRIP addresses inconveniences and delays related to Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)-based lists, and is taking actions to reduce case processing time.

However, “DHS TRIP is not able to provide redress for passengers who may have been misidentified to high-risk, rules-based lists and subsequently applied to DHS TRIP for redress,” GAO said. According to TSA officials, though, TSA has taken steps to mitigate impacts on these passengers.”

Last month, Homeland Security Today reported that the US District Court for the District of Oregon ruled that DHS TRIP does not provide a meaningful mechanism for travelers who have been denied boarding to correct erroneous information in the government's terrorism databases.

Finding for the plaintiffs in a lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of 13 American Muslims, the court concluded that the Department of Justice must change the redress procedures for persons on the No-Fly List.

“In so doing, the government will endeavor to increase transparency for certain individuals denied boarding who believe they are on the No Fly List and have submitted DHS TRIP inquiries, consistent with the protection of national security and national security information, as well as transportation security,”stated the Court’s Opinion and Order.

GAO’s audit indicated, however, that DHS TRIP and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) have made progress in addressing Secure Flight misidentifications to TSDB-based lists, and that DHS TRIP plans to continue to evaluate ways to improve the timeframe for the appeals process.

“Officials stated that if DHS TRIP finds it is not making adequate progress by February 2015—about 1 year after the program began taking specific actions to reduce the overall review time—it would first evaluate whether further changes and improvements could be made to shorten the appeals process before considering, in collaboration with TSC and the DHS Screening Coordination Office, a change to the 60-day time frame stated in the appeals letter,” states the GAO.

GAO concluded that, “It will be important for DHS TRIP to conduct its assessments of performance data as planned to determine whether further changes to the appeals process, such as changes to the time frames presented in DHS’s appeals letter, are warranted.”

http://www.hstoday.us/

No comments:

Post a Comment