Israel attacks in Syria, destroying Hezbollah-bound arms

Israel attacks in Syria, destroying Hezbollah-bound arms

Published 27 April 2015

 

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) launched two attacks on targets located inside Syria army bases – the first attacks took place on the night between Wednesday and Thursday, and the second wave of attacks took place the night between Friday and Saturday. The targets destroyed in the attacks were Iran-made long-range missiles which the Assad regime stored and maintained for Hezbollah, the Shi’a Lebanese militia. Since January 2013, the IAF conducted ten such attacks – the attacks Wednesday night and Friday night were attacks number nine and ten.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) launched two attacks on targets located inside Syria army bases – the first attacks took place on the night between Wednesday and Thursday, and the second wave of attacks took place the night between yesterday (Friday) and today (Saturday).
Two Arab media outlets – Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya – report that the targets destroyed in the attacks were Iran-made long-range missiles which the Assad regime stores and maintains for Hezbollah, the Shi’a Lebanese militia.
SANA, Syria’s official news agency, did not acknowledge the attacks, but several pro-government outlets reported explosions near the town of Qateyfah.
In the first half-hour or so of the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the IAF destroyed nearly all of Hezbollah’s long-range missiles. Iran has been arming Hezbollah with some of the most advanced weapon systems in the Iranian arsenal, but to make it less likely that Israel would attack and destroy these systems, Iran and the Assad regime – Hezbollah’s backers – have decided to store and maintain these systems on Syrian soil, on the assumption that Israel would be more reluctant to attack targets inside Syria than targets in Lebanon.
This post-2006 approach by Iran — keeping its more advanced military supplies to Hezbollah in Syrian military bases close to the Lebanese border — has largely worked. The exceptions have occurred when Iran or the Assad regime tried to take these systems out of storage and deliver them to Hezbollah. In at least some of the cases, the decision to take these advanced systems out of storage and put them on convoys to Lebanon was made when anti-regime rebel forces were gaining ground and closing in on the storage sites. Fearing that these systems would fall into rebels’ hands, Iran, on a few occasions, decided to move them across the border into Lebanon.
When Israeli intelligence spotted these convoys – or noticed preparations at the Syrian storage sites to load such convoys – the IAF was sent to destroy the convoy, the storage facility, or both.
Since January 2013, the IAF conducted ten such attacks – the attacks Wednesday night and Friday night were attacks number nine and ten. The previous attacks took place on 30 January 2013, 3 May 2013, 5 May 2013, 5 July 2013, 18 October 2013, 30 October 2013, 26 January 2014, and 24 February 2014.
All the attacks destroyed targets on Syrian soil, except the 24 February 2014 attack: A Syrian military convoy carrying Iranian arms to Hezbollah managed to cross into Lebanon under the cover of clouds and bad weather, so the IAF destroyed it on Lebanese soil.
The Israeli airstrikes have targeted four categories of armaments:

• Advanced air defense systems such as the SA-17 batteries. Such systems were bombed in a convoy outside Damascus on 30 January 2013. If deployed in Lebanon, theses missile could erode Israel’s air superiority over Lebanon, where the Israel Air Force (IAF) now operates with impunity.
• Longer and more accurate surface-to-surface missiles, including the Iranian-made Fateh-110s. Such systems were targeted in strikes on 3 and 5 May 2013 around Damascus. The missiles, with a range of 190 miles and accurate to within 200 yards, could threaten targets such as power plants deep inside Israel.
• Long-range precision land-to-sea missiles such as the Russian-made Yakhont hypersonic anti-ship missiles. These systems were targeted by Israel at least four times — 5 May 2013, 5 July 2013, and 18 and 30 October 2013. The cruise missiles, flying several times faster than sound, would threaten Israeli ships and off-shore natural gas platforms.
• Unconventional weapons such as chemical weapons, which Syria has agreed to surrender to the UN for destruction, and biological weapons. The 30 January 2013 strike on the SA-17 convoy also targeted a biological weapons research facility.

Al Jazeera reports that IAF jets launched missiles at bases of Syria’s 155th and 65th strategic missile brigades, stationed in Qalamoun, near the Syria-Lebanon border. Residents of nearby cities Yabroud and Qarah reported hearing a series of powerful explosions.
Haaretz reports that former Syrian opposition leader Hadi al-Bahra tweeted that the IAF also attacked the 92nd battalion, in addition to the attacks on the 155th and 65th brigades. The Syrian opposition keeps a close eye on the base of the 155th brigade, since it is responsible for launching Scud and Scud-B missiles against opposition forces in the area.
The IDF, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, and the Ministry of Defense refused to comment on the attacks.
IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly reported Thursday that in 2013 or 2014, Hezbollah had constructed an airstrip in the Lebanon Beqaa Valley, which would allow the organization to launch its Iran-supplied unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The airstrip is located about ten kilometers from the city of Hermel, which is about eighteen kilometers from the Syrian border.
Hezbollah operates several Iranian-made UAVs, including the Ababil-3 — which has been employed over Syria by forces allied with the Syrian regime — and possibly the newer and larger Shahed-129.
Analysis
Israeli analysts point out that Iran’s nuclear program continues to be a major preoccupation of Israel, but the agreement which is likely to be signed by the end of June between the P5+1 group and Iran would make it unlikely that Israel would launch a unilateral military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Moreover, any agreement between the P5+1 and Iran – that is, if Iran does not cheat, and if any indication of cheating is met with a firm international response — would freeze some aspects of Iran’s nuclear program for 10-15 years, while keeping the entire program under a most intrusive inspection and monitoring for twenty-five years (again: if the Iranians live up to the letter and spirit of the agreement and if the P5+1 are determined to hold Iran to its word).
Israel has thus been turning its attention to more immediate threats, chief among them Hezbollah. In the summer of 2006, when the war between Israel and Hezbollah erupted, the Shi’a organization had about 20,000 rockets and missiles in its arsenal. It now has about 120,000.
Moreover, many of the missiles Hezbollah now has have longer range, heavier payload, and are much more accurate than the missile the organization had nine years ago. The damage these weapons can inflict on Israel’s infrastructure and urban centers would be considerable.
The sheer number of missile Hezbollah has also means that Israel’s vaunted Iron Dome defense system would be far less effective than it was during the summer 2014 was with Hamas.
In addition, learning from its mistakes in 2006, the organization has dispersed its weapons among the Shi’a population in southern and eastern Lebanon. Any military campaign by Israel to minimize the damage to Israel’s infrastructure and urban centers by hunting down and destroying Hezbollah’s weapon systems would thus require Israel to inflict destruction on Lebanese Shi’a towns and villages on a scale which would dwarf the destruction Israel inflicted on the Gaza Strip during last summer’s war with Hamas.
Another issue Israel faces is that there is an inverse correlation between how secure the Assad regime is, and how eager are the Iranians to take their advanced systems out of storage in Syria and move them to Lebanon. The more secure Assad is, the more comfortable Iran is keeping its Hezbollah-bound arms in Syrian storage. The more insecure Assad is, the less comfortable Iran is keeping these systems on Syrian soil, where they might be taken over by the anti-Assad rebels.
In the last few weeks, despite Iran’s continued massive support, the Assad regime forces have lost important ground:

• ISIS and al-Nusra forces, for a few days, took over the large Palestinian refugee camp at Yarmouk, near Damascus
• Pitched battles between the rebels and the Syrian army have again erupted in the Qalamoun Mountains near the Lebanese border – an area of strategic importance, which the regime believed it had secured last year. The forces controlling the area have an effective control of important sections of the Syria-Lebanon border.
• Rebel forces have, on several occasions, bombarded Damascus International Airport
• In the past two days rebel forces captured the northwestern Syrian city of Jisr al-Shughour for the first time since 2011. The city, on a road between the coastal city of Latakia and the city of Aleppo, is now fully controlled by rebels. Reports from the field note that after capturing the city, the rebels are continuing their assault, aiming to push the Syrian army from the few remaining government-controlled areas in the province of Idlib. Military analysts note that by taking Jisr al-Shughour, the rebels are now closer to the coastal province of Latakia, President Bashar al-Assad’s stronghold, and are now less than five miles from several villages and towns loyal to the government near the coast.